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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the prosecutor f s f a i l u r e to provide inculpatory 
evidence af ter voluntary compliance with a discovery request deny 
defendant a f a i r t r i a l ? 
2. Did the court correc t ly deny de fendan t s motion for 
a m i s t r i a l due to alleged surpr i se evidence that defendant 
claimed would have supported a motion to sever had he known about 
the evidence before t r i a l ? 
3 . Was i t error for the t r i a l court to deny 
defendant 's motion for a m i s t r i a l due to witness references to 
defendant having been in prison and on parole when defense 
counsel e l i c i t e d tha t information and fa i led to ask tha t the jury 
be ins t ruc ted to disregard the information? 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , 
- v -
JOHNNIE PATRICK KNIGHT, 
Defendant -Appel lant . 
Case No. 20670 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with Aggravated Robbery, a first-
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1978). 
Defendant was convicted in a jury trial held March 12-13, 1985, 
in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable David B. Dee, presiding. 
Defendant was sentenced by Judge Dee on April 26, 1985, to an 
indeterminate term of five years to life at the Utah State 
Prison. 
STATEMENT QF FACTS 
The One-Hour Mar t in i z ing Cleaners a t 16 89 South West 
Temple was robbed by two men armed with a knife and a gun a t 1:30 
p.m. on February 2 , 1984 (T. 149, 150) . A man, l a t e r i d e n t i f i e d 
by a s t o r e employee as Je f f Richens, came i n t o the s t o r e t o ask 
d i r e c t i o n s about t e n minutes before t h e robbery (T. 162) . When 
•the two robbers came through the back door they wore bandana 
masks, dark h a t s and dark sweaters (T. 150) . The man with the 
gun ordered the s to re -owner , Bruce Andersen, t o l i e on the f loor 
while the man with the knife forced the only employee to open the 
cash r e g i s t e r (T. 151 f 152, 164) , then ordered her to l i e on the 
f loor , also (T. 153, 164). The robbers took a wal le t and 
checkbook from Andersen, cut the telephone cord and l e f t (T. 153, 
164). Andersen got up and gave chase (T. 153, 174). 
As the two robbers ran down West Temple Christopher 
Laub, a passerby, noticed them and saw tha t they were being 
chased (T. 170). Laub followed them in to an al ley where they 
jumped in to a Datsun and drove off (T. 172). Laub wrote down the 
Datsun fs l icense number and noticed tha t a t h i rd person with long 
hai r was driving the car (T. 172-173). Laub caught up with 
Andersen and stayed to ident i fy the getaway car for pol ice 
(T. 174) . 
Later tha t day, police located a Datsun parked in West 
Valley and Laub iden t i f i ed i t as the getaway car (T. 174, 187-
188). The Datsun was reg is te red to Jeff Richens1 wife (T. 190). 
Inside the car, pol ice found the car keys and several 
incriminat ing items (T. 189-192). On the back seat was 
Andersen's dr iver l i cense and a c red i t card (T. 189). In the 
glove box was Jeff Richens1 wal le t with h is driver l icense and 
other i den t i f i c a t i on (T. 192). In the trunk were a black 
tur t leneck sweater, 2 cowboy handkerchiefs, a blue watch cap and 
a brown watch cap along with defendant Knight 's wal let (T. 194-
195) . 
Defendant Knight claimed he and h i s wife were with a 
neighbor, Georgia Moore, in Moore's apartment a t the time of the 
robbery (T. 197-198). I n i t i a l l y , Mrs. Moore corroborated 
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d e f e n d a n t ' s s t o r y (T. 202, 213 , 249-250) . Sometime l a t e r , 
pos s ib ly i n May, Mrs. Moore t o l d i n v e s t i g a t o r s t h a t she had l i e d 
about defendant being i n her home a t t h a t time (T. 205-206, 214 ) . 
She s a id t h a t defendant asked her t o l i e fo r him, t e l l i n g her 
t h a t he was suspec ted of a robbery he did not commit and t h a t he 
had a c t u a l l y been with a g i r l f r i e n d and did not want h i s wife t o 
f ind out about i t (T. 212, 248 ) . 
J e f f Richens, who pled g u i l t y in an e a r l i e r 
p r o s e c u t i o n , t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l t h a t he drove the getaway car on 
the day of the robbery (T. 270, 274-276). Richens sa id defendant 
Knight and co-defendant Ridlon were t h e two men who a c t u a l l y 
robbed the c l ean ing s t o r e (T. 276-27 9 ) . After t he robbery, 
Richens drove the car and t h e co-defendants t o t h e West Val ley 
l o c a t i o n where the car was l a t e r d i scovered and l e f t i t t h e r e 
(T. 280-281) . All t h r e e went i n t o an apartment belonging t o 
R i d l o n ' s g i r l f r i e n d (T. 281) . After a few minutes , both 
defendant Knight and Richens l e f t on foot and walked t o a small 
market on Redwood Road (T. 282-283) . Defendant Knight te lephoned 
a f r i end t o pick them up (T. 283-284, 321-322) . 
Walter Moore, Georgia Moore's husband, picked up 
defendants Knight and Richens and drove pas t t h e Datsun a t t h e i r 
r eques t t o see if i t was a l l r i g h t (T. 323) . Knight and Richens 
t o l d Mr. Moore t h a t they had car t r o u b l e but they did not s top t o 
work on the car when Mr. Moore drove pas t (T. 3 2 1 , 324) . Moore 
took Richens t o Richens ' home and wai ted whi le Richens went 
i n s i d e for a few minutes (T. 324) . Then a l l t h r e e men went on t o 
Moore's home (T. 3 2 4 ) . L a t e r , Moore drove Richens and Knight t o 
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the University of Utah where he dropped them off and left 
(T. 324). Neither defendants Knight nor Richens mentioned the 
robbery at that time (T. 328-329)• 
Sometime in the first of March, the Moores and the 
Knights moved to California together (T. 255, 329). They lived 
in the same house but after about a month the relationship became 
strained (T. 255-256)• The Moores left California and left their 
belongings behind (T. 256-260). When some of their belongings 
turned up missing, the Moores suspected defendant Knight had 
taken them but also suspected another family (T. 257)• 
The Moores took some items belonging to that family and were 
confronted by them and the police as a result (T. 258). 
The items were returned, no arrests or charges were made, and 
Mrs. Moore testified that she did not change her story about 
defendant's alibi to retaliate for this sequence of events 
(T. 260) . 
The jury acquitted co-defendant Ridlon and convicted 
defendant Knight of the robbery (R. 39, 40). Defendant Knight 
appeals. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The prosecutor's failure to disclose inculpatory 
evidence did not affect defendant's right to a fair trial where 
defendant received the information during trial and was 
adequately prepared to meet it. The only prejudice defendant 
claims he suffered was that he would have accepted an earlier 
plea bargain offer had he known the State would present the 
evidence. Thus, the outcome of the trial was unaffected and 
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de fendan t s claim of ineffect iveness of counsel on the same 
grounds also f a i l s . 
The t r i a l court properly refused a mis t r i a l request on 
the grounds that defendant would have moved to sever had he known 
the evidence would be presented. The evidence defendant 
complains of went only to h is own cu lpab i l i ty and would have been 
admissible even in a separate t r i a l . The evidence did not 
implict ly or exp l i c t ly exonerate his co-defendant but merely 
strengthened the case against defendant. Although there was 
f inger-point ing by co-defendant 's counsel/ the defenses were not 
t o t a l l y i r reconc i lab le and the motion for mis t r i a l was properly 
denied. 
References to defendant 's prison and parole s ta tus was 
e l i c i t e d by defense counsel on cross-examination. Defendant did 
not request tha t the material be s t r icken even though he claimed 
i t was unresponsive to propounded questions and defendant cannot 
be heard to claim on appeal tha t i t was error not to s t r i ke the 
testimony. The Judge's comments of which defendant complains did 
not imply tha t defendant was incarcerated even if the jury heard 
them. Moreoverr i t i s disputed whether any of the jurors didf in 
fac t , hear the request t ha t defendants be returned to court a t a 
spec i f ic time. These comments did not, therefore , cause the jury 
to disregard the presumption of innocence in the way tha t 




THE PROSECUTOR'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE 
INCULPATORY EVIDENCE DID NOT VIOLATE 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL NOR 
HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL. 
Walter and Georgia Moore t e s t i f i e d on behalf of the 
State a t t r i a l . Defendant did not a t f i r s t object to Ms. Moore's 
testimony even though the pol ice off icer who t e s t i f i e d 
immediately preceding Ms. Moore indicated tha t he arranged for 
Ms. Moore to ta lk to the County Attorney 's office to recant her 
o r ig ina l statement corroborating defendant 's a l i b i (T. 205-207). 
During cross-examination/ defense counsel e l i c i t e d from Ms. Moore 
information t h a t she had in fact given a statement to Brad 
Adamson of the County Attorney 's office on the subject about 
which she had j u s t t e s t i f i e d (T. 215-216). At tha t point defense 
counsel indicated to the court tha t she did not have a copy of 
the statement to Adamson and requested a copy before continuing 
with cross-examination (T. 216). The court then granted defense 
counse l ' s request to continue cross-examining Ms. Moore un t i l 
af ter she received a copy of the notes taken by Adamson (T. 218). 
When the copy had not arr ived af ter about 20 minutes t ime, court 
recessed for the day at 4:30 p.m. (T. 218, 228). Defense counsel 
did not object or request more time when the court indicated i t 
would reconvene at 9:30 a.m. the next day (T. 227). 
At 9:30 the next morningf defense counsel made a motion 
for m i s t r i a l based upon the claimed surpr ise use of Walter 
Moore's testimony only (T. 231-234). During tha t motion, defense 
counsel s ta ted tha t the prosecutor informed her of the existence 
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of tha t statement and supplied her with a copy after court 
recessed the night before (T. 231). Defense counsel also 
indicated a t tha t time tha t she knew both Walter and Georgia 
Moore might be witnesses because she, herself f had unsuccessfully 
attempted to loca te them prior to t r i a l (T. 233) . Both persons1 
names appear on the information f i l ed November 30, 1984 as being 
S t a t e ' s witnesses (R. 19) . Judge Dee denied the motion for 
m i s t r i a l . 
On appeal, defendant claims the t r i a l court erred in 
denying h is motion for a m i s t r i a l . This Court wil l reverse a 
t r i a l cou r t f s denial of a motion for mis t r i a l only where i t was a 
clear abuse of d i sc re t ion . S ta te v. Hodges. 30 Utah 2d 367, 527 
P.2d 1322 (1974). In t h i s case i t was not a clear abuse of 
d iscre t ion because the motion was predicated on grounds for which 
other remedies exis ted , i . e . f more time to prepare. Moreover, i t 
appears that defendant had suf f ic ien t time to prepare because his 
only request for a continuance f discussed further below, was for 
the purpose of perhaps renegot ia t ing a plea bargain with the 
prosecutor. 
After h is motion for mis t r i a l was denied, defendant 
requested a continuance un t i l the afternoon (T. 240-241). The 
prosecutor offered to ca l l Mr. Moore in the afternoon but 
requested tha t the t r i a l not be continued (T. 241). Judge Dee 
denied the continuance (T. 241) and Ms. Moore t e s t i f i e d af ter the 
two-hour lunch break (T. 309, 319). 
On appeal, defendant argues tha t the use of the Moore's 
testimony was pre judic ia l error because the prosecutor fa i led to 
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disclose the two inculpatory statements and because of surprise. 
Defendant bases these claims almost entirely on case law dealing 
with the failure of a prosecutor to disclose exculpatory 
information that the defense discovers only after trial and the 
absence of which prejudiced the defendant because there was a 
reasonable probability that use of the evidence would have 
affected the outcome of the trial. See Brady v. Maryland. 373 
U.S. 83 (1963); Moore v. Illinois. 408 U.S. 786 (1972); United 
States v, Aqurs. 427 U.S. 97 (1976). As this Court stated in 
State v. Workman. 635 P.2d 49 (Utah 1981), only undisclosed 
exculpatory evidence comes within the purview of Bi&sfyL, HQQJL& and 
Agnus* 
Recently, however, this Court noted in State v. Carter. 
707 P.2d 656f 662 (Utah 1985)f that: 
[Elven though there is no court-ordered 
disclosure, a prosecutor's failure to 
disclose newly discovered inculpatory 
information which falls within the ambit 
of § 77-35-16(a), after the prosecution 
has made a voluntary disclosure of 
evidence might so mislead defendant as 
to cause prejudicial error. 
The Court found, however, that Carter was not such a case. The 
evidence in this case, like the evidence in Carter, was not from 
an eyewitness to the robbery. The Moore1s testimony merely 
indicated 1) that defendant lied to the police about an alibi and 
2) placed defendant with an accomplice after the robbery was 
committed. Other substantial evidence tied defendant to the 
robbery (accomplice testimony and the location of his wallet in 
the get-away car). Accordingly, the trial court properly denied 
the motion for mistrial predicated on Walter Moore's testimony. 
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Notably, since defendant did not move for a mis t r i a l or any other 
remedy in the case of Georgia Moore1s testimony, tha t issue was 
not preserved for appeal. Even if i t had been preserved, a 
m i s t r i a l would not have been warranted. 
Defendant received the appropriate remedy for surpr ise 
testimony. Other s t a t e courts have held tha t a t r i a l court 
should grant a defendant a continuance in the face of genuine 
su rp r i se . E.g. Daniels v. S t a t e . 558 P.2d 405 (Okla. Cr. 1977); 
State v. Ford. 108 Ariz. 404, 499 P.2d 699 (1972), ce r t . den. 409 
U.S. 1128 (1972); People v. Renfrow, 564 P.2d 411 (Colo. 1977). 
At defense counsel ' s request , cross-examination of Georgia Moore 
was continued from one afternoon un t i l the next morning without 
further requests from defendant for more time. Then, although 
the t r i a l i t s e l f was not continued, Walter Moore's testimony was 
delayed un t i l the afternoon session allowing defendant several 
hours to consider the impact of the evidence—from the time i t 
was disclosed on the evening before unt i l 2:00 p.m. tha t day. 
Notably, defendant did not request more time to prepare to meet 
t h i s so-cal led surpr ise evidence. Instead, he asked for a 
continuance so tha t he might approach the prosecutor about r e -
opening plea negot ia t ions . Faced with t h i s request , the Court 
was en t i r e ly correct in ascer ta in ing that defendant could 
continue with other witnesses while contemplating t ha t 
p o s s i b i l i t y . Evidently, the prosecutor was not in te res ted in r e -
opening plea negot ia t ions anyway because he requested tha t t r i a l 
not be delayed (T. 241). 
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Finally, it is not clear that defendant had absolutely 
no idea what Georgia Moore might say. Defendant received, and 
introduced at trial, a letter form Ms. Moore that indicated at 
least to some extent her unfriendly feelings about defendant. 
This letter was dated August 8, 1984 (T. 261-263). In light of 
the fact that the State indicated on the Information filed 3 
months after the date of this letter that Ms. Moore was to be a 
witness for the State, defendant cannot have been genuinely 
surprised that Ms* Moore no longer intended to corroborate his 
alibi story. 
Defendant also claims that he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel due to the nondisclosure and alleged 
surprise. Defendant's claim does not revolve around counsel's 
ability to prepare to meet the evidence. Instead, defendant says 
that he may have accepted a plea bargain if he had known of these 
two statements. Defendant cites no case law supporting his 
position that it is a denial of effective assistance of counsel 
for an attorney to fail to advise a guilty defendant to plead 
guilty pre-trial when a more favorable plea bargain is offered. 
All of the case law cited by defendant deals with the situation 
where pre-trial lack of preparation affected the ability of 
counsel to adequately represent the defendant .at ±xi&l. 
Defendant ingeniously twists the case law dealing with 
voluntary and intelligent guilty pleas to say that, well, a nat 
guilty plea should be entered intelligently, also. While the 
State would certainly be delighted to receive guilty pleas from 
all guilty defendants prior to trial, it cannot agree that it is 
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ineffective assistance of counsel for the defense attorney to 
advise even a guilty defendant facing strong evidence to force 
the State to abide by the presumption of innocence and prove its 
case beyond a reasonable doubt. When a guilty defendant does not 
accept a good deal when it is offered by the Statef the State 
should not be forced to suffer such claims of ineffectiveness 
when the defendant is ultimately found guilty by a jury. 
This Court in a very similar case recently found no 
merit to an ineffectiveness complaint. In State v. Geary, 19 
Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Sept. 26, 1985)f the Court noted that 
defendants must show both that (1) his counsel's performance was 
deficient in some demonstrable manner, and (2) but for the 
deficiencyf the outcome of the trial would probably have been 
different. Gaary, 19 Utah Adv. Rep. at 13; Codianna v> Morris, 
660 p.2d 1101 (Utah 1983); United States v, Cronic, U.S. 
f 104 s.ct. 2039 (1984); Strickland Vt Washington, U.S. 
, 104. S.Ct. 2052 (1984). Defendant, here, as did the 
defendant in Geary, "loses sight of the fact that our state and 
federal constitution guarantee fair trials, not plea bargains." 
19 Utah Adv. Rep. at 13. 
Defendant cannot meet either of the two tests set forth 
above. First, defense counsel1s performance was not defective 
because she was prepared to meet the evidence of Walter and 
Georgia Moore. She did attempt to impeach them through showing a 
possible motive to lie because of an earlier disagreement with 
defendant. Second, defendant does not claim that counsel could 
have altered the outcome of the trial, only that he might have 
-11-
accepted a p l e a - b a r g a i n o f fe r i f he had known t h e S t a t e would 
p r e s e n t the Moores1 t e s t imony . Defendan t ' s argument t h a t defense 
counsel was i n e f f e c t i v e i s , consequen t ly , unpe r suas ive . 
POINT I I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE 
MOTION FOR MISTRIAL GROUNDED IN 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT HE WOULD HAVE 
MOVED TO SEVER HAD HE BEEN AWARE 
OF CERTAIN EVIDENCE. 
After defendant was faced wi th evidence from Walter and 
Georgia Moore i m p l i c a t i n g only defendant and not h i s co-
defendant , defendant moved for a m i s t r i a l (T. 314) . Defendant 
argued t h a t he would have moved for severance from h i s co-
defendant p r i o r t o t r i a l had he known t h e Moores would i m p l i c a t e 
him. He complained t h a t by i m p l i c a t i n g him, the Moores1 
t es t imony exonera ted h i s co-defendant and c r e a t e d a n t a g o n i s t i c 
de f ense s . 
Nothing about t h e Morers ' tes t imony sugges ted t h a t co-
defendant Ridlon was not involved in t h e robbery . What t h e i r 
t es t imony i n d i c a t e d was t h a t defendant Knight &&£ involved i n t h e 
robbery . I t s t r e t c h e s t h e imagina t ion t o conclude t h a t t h i s 
i n c r i m i n a t i n g tes t imony c r e a t e d a n t a g o n i s t i c defenses between t h e 
co-defendants merely because i t i m p l i c a t e d , by c o r r o b o r a t i n g 
Richens ' t e s t imony , only one of them. The tes t imony of 
accomplice Richens impl i ca ted both defendants whi le the Moores1 
tes t imony merely s t r eng thened t h e case a g a i n s t Knight wi thout 
e l i m i n a t i n g Ridlon. 
Defendant r easons t h a t t h e Moores' tes t imony led t o 
f i n g e r - p o i n t i n g by co-defendant Ridlon. Such f i n g e r - p o i n t i n g , 
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however, was not the result of the Moores1 testimony alone but 
was more the result of Richens1 story itself and the facts that 
an eyewitness identified the driver of the car as possibly being 
female and that another witness said that Richens had been inside 
the store just prior to the robbery. True, these facts probably 
led the jury to believe there were only two men involved in the 
robbery, Richens and defendant, but they could easily have 
reached the same conclusion in a trial without Ridlon present to 
point fingers at defendant. 
Host importantly, 
hostility between co-defendants, or the fact 
that one defendant may try to cast blame 
on the other, is not in itself sufficient 
reason to require separate trials, unless 
the defendants can prove their defenses 
were irreconcilable. 
United States v. Pnckett. 692 F.2d 663 (10th Cir. 1982). The 
problem in this case is not that the defenses were irreconcilable 
but that proof as to one defendant was merely stronger than the 
proof as to the other. The evidence against defendant would not 
have been any less persuasive in the absence of Ridlon and all of 
it would have been admissible in a separate trial. Clearly, it 
was not the presence of Ridlon as a co-defendant that prejudiced 
defendant, but was the strength of the State1s case against 
defendant that persuaded the jury of his guilt. 
The standard of review where a trial court denies a 
motion for severance is whether the court abused its discretion 
and whether the defendant's right to a fair trial was impaired by 
that denial. State v. Collins. 612 P.2d 775, 777 (Utah 1980); 
State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985). Likewise, the 
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standard for review of a motion for mistrial based on a lack of 
severance should be abuse of discretion, c.f. State v. Hodges, 
30 Utah 2d 367, 527 P.2d 1322 (1974). Here there was no abuse of 
discretion where lack of severance did not affect defendant's 
right to a fair trial in any manner* 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED THE 
MOTIONS FOR MISTRIAL BASED ON EVIDENCE 
ELICITED BY DEFENSE COUNSEL. 
During cross-examination of two State's witnesses, 
defense counsel asked questions which elicited responses 
indicating that defendant had been in prison and on parole 
(T. 304, 336). Counsel objected to these answers as being 
unresponsive and requested preservation of the objections for 
motions outside the juryfs hearing (T. 304, 336). Counsel did 
not request that the answers be stricken but instead moved for a 
mistrial (T. 320-321, 348-350). The court denied the motions 
(T. 312f 350). 
At the noon recess, after the court adjourned and the 
jury was dismissed from the courtroom, the judge said, "Bring 
your defendants back at 1:30. Can you do that?" (T. 309). No 
response to this question is reflected in the record to indicate 
to whom the judge spoke. Defendant insists that the jury, some 
of whom he claims might have heard it, concluded from this 
question that defendant was incarcerated during trial. Defendant 
meved for a mistrial and the motion was denied (T. 317-318, 351). 
Later, the judge looked at the record to reaffirm his position on 
the matter and indicated to defendant that he may have been 
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"looking a t the t ranspor ta t ion off icer" when he asked the 
question (T. 351). The judge did not change h is rul ing on the 
motion. 
F i r s t , defendant 's claim tha t h is motion for mis t r i a l 
on grounds tha t witnesses referred to h is prison and parole 
s t a tus should have been granted i s incor rec t . This Court long 
ago determined tha t where i t was a defendant 's own attorney who 
asked the quest ions t ha t e l i c i t e d the answers, defendant i s in no 
posi t ion to complain of the answers. S ta te v, Meyers, 14 Utah 2d 
417, 385 P.2d 609 (1963). If the answers were not responsive to 
the quest ions , defense counsel should have requested tha t they be 
s t r icken as not responsive rather than moving for a m i s t r i a l . 
I t i s not clear tha t the answers were not responsive to 
defense counsel ' s questioning f in any event. The f i r s t reference 
to defendant 's parole s t a tus came from accomplice Richens after a 
se r i es of questions about who was Richens1 parole agent (see 
Appendix A). Richens indicated he had been switched from one 
agent to another and could not r eca l l who was h is agent a t a 
pa r t i cu la r point in time (T. 303). Defense counsel asked, "Do 
you remember John Shepard? Do you know who John Shepard i s ? " 
(T. 304). After an affirmative response she asked, "Do you 
remember his [Shephard'sl taking you over to Detective Nelson's 
office so you could make a statement about the 6th of February?" 
(T. 304). When Richens agreed, defense counsel continued, "Do 
you remember—does tha t refresh your memory as to whether he was 
your parole agent a t tha t time?" (T. 304). Richens responded 
tha t Shepard was defendant 's agent a t tha t time. 
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In the context of the e n t i r e l i ne of quest ioning, the 
answer was responsive as to who John Shepard was and whether he 
was the witness1 parole agent a t the time. Because the answer 
was responsive to quest ions asked by defense counsel, defendant 
cannot complain of the reference to parole , especia l ly where he 
made no motion to s t r i k e the answer. 
The next reference to defendant 's prison s t a tus came 
from Walter Moore, a neighbor of defendant. Defense counsel 
asked i f defendant and Moore were fr iends before the two famil ies 
moved together to Cal i fornia . Then asked, "You'd known him for 
how long?" Moore repied, "Just a few months before tha t when he 
got out of prison (T. 336). This answer was responsive to 
counse l ' s questioning because i t placed the f r iendship in to a 
time-frame tha t i s a common responsive technique. Again, if 
counsel thought the response was not responsive, she could have 
moved to s t r i k e i t immediately, but again chose to wait and move 
for a m i s t r i a l . 
F ina l ly , defendant claims the t r i a l judge improperly 
implied to the jury tha t defendant was in custody by requesting 
tha t defendant re turn by 1:30 p.m. I t i s disputed in the record 
whether any ju ro r s were within hearing when the remark was made 
(T. 317-318, 351). Even if there were jurors within earshot , 
Judge Dee's remark in no way referred to incarcera t ion . What the 
Judge said was, "Bring your defendants back a t 1:30. Can you do 
tha t ?" There was no response to t ha t question in the record. 
Any jurors who might have remained in the courtroom, even though 
they had been dismissed, could j u s t as eas i ly have thought the 
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Judge was talking to defense counsel because nothing directed the 
statement toward a police officer or jailer. 
Defendant relies on cases holding that it is 
constitutional error to compel a defendant to stand trial in 
prison clothing as precedent for his claim that the Judge 
prejudiced him here. E.g. Estelle v, Williams. 425 U.S. 501 
(1976); Chess v. Smith. 617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980). These cases 
are not particularly persuasive here because the jurors were not 
faced with a blatant, constant reminder of the defendant's 
incarceration that might have affected their ability to apply the 
presumption of innocence. At least one of the alleged errors, 
the Judge1s remarks, could have been interpreted in other ways by 
the jury. The other two references to prison and parole were 
elicited by the defense counsel. In the absence of a motion to 
strike the answers, defendant should not be heard to complain of 
alleged errors. 
Moreover, having a transportation officer in the 
courtroom furthers an essential state interest, a quality that is 
absent in requiring defendants to appear in prison garb. Estelle 
v. Williams. 425 U.S. 502, 505 (1976). The security of the 
defendant, the public, and court personnel and spectators is 
certainly an essential interest where defendants are in custody. 
The Judge1s reference to returning defendant at a particular time 
cannot have been any more offensive to defendant's right than 
wpuld the mere presence of a jail employee acting as security for 
an incarcerated defendant. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon t h e fo rego ing , t h e S t a t e r e q u e s t s t h i s Court 
t o aff i rm d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n and deny h i s a l t e r n a t i v e r eques t 
for a new t r i a l . 
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APPENDIX A 
75 
1 Q Do you remember John Shepard? Do you know who 
2 John Shepard is? 
3 A Yes, I do. 
4 Q Do you remember his taking you over to Detective 
5 Nelson's office so you could make a statement about the 6th 
6 of February? 
7 A Yes, ma'am. 
8 Q Do you remember - - does that refresh your 
9 memory as to whether he was your parole agent at that time? 
10 A He was - - he was Johnnie Knight's parole agent 
H at that time, and I believe that is the time they started 
12 switching me from one to another. 
13 MS. NESSET-SALE: Your Honor, I would 
14 indicate an objection. His response was not responsive to 
15 nY question. And I would reserve a motion outside the 
16 presence of the jury. 
17 THE COURT: All right. 
18 Q Did you tell your parole agent that you were 
19 not involved in this robbery? 
20 A Yes. When I called my wife I had found out 
21 that officers had went to my house, so I called who I believed} 
22 was my parole officer at that time, Giles. Ifm not positive 
23 
24 
of his first name. 
Q John Giles? 




Q Excuse me. I thought you'd finished. 
A I had finished. 
0 Did you finish? 
A Yes, ma'am. 
Q Did you call your wife the day of the robbery 
and tell her you were in Vernal? 
A Yes, ma'am. 
Q To protect her from knowing what you had been 
doing? 
A Yes, ma'am. 
Q Was your parole agent John Shepard? 
A In the three months I was out I had - - or in 
the time I was out I had four different parole officers. 
I'm not positive who was the parole officer at that time 
because I was being switched around. 
Q What time was your release from the prison prior 
to this February robbery? 
A December 13th. 
Q So you were no longer in a halfway house or 
anything? 
A No. 
Q You were just on parole? 
A I was in prison, and I was released right from 
prison. 
